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NOTES

will be overruled only upon presentment of evidence proving prior
illegal narcotics transactions may be drawn from these statements.
Conclusion
For the federal courts, the basic teaching on the entrapment
doctrine is to be found in the Supreme Court case of Sorrells v.
United States.65 Yet, in applying the rules as formulated in this
case, an appellate court has in one case upheld and in another reversed a conviction on substantially similar factual situations. Such
a glaring difference of opinion obviously requires that a more precise
standard be set by the Supreme Court. Although the authority of
law enforcement officers must be limited if adequate protection is to
be afforded to law abiding citizens, it is essential that the law itself
must be definite if these officials are to know the scope of their
authority. Perhaps in granting certiorari in the Zi14ciale case, the
Supreme Court will avail itself of this opportunity to clarify the law
of entrapment in the federal courts.

CY PRES IN NEW Yo1iK
Testatrix executed' a will in 1934--and died in- 1938 a resident
of New York. By the terms of the will a trust was'created for the
benefit of testatrix' sister -for life'-vith renimindei 'to a- -haritable
hospital in Great Britain. The life tenant died in 1950 and the remainder in trust ordinarily -'oufd have t'ss'ed. without .question
except that by 1948 the British government had takeitfile to all
hospital property and nationalized all medical services."- Is the hospital still a charity within the intent of the testatrix as expressed in
the will and the surrounding circ'umstb nc? . r, -'do the"fa1ts make
appropriate an exercise by the court of its cy pres power? The
answer, as provided by the New York courts in two recent cases,'
makes timely an examination of current trends in the application of
the cy pres doctrine in New York.3
65287 U.S. 435 (1932).

See National Health Service Act, 1946, 9 & 10 GEo. 6, c. 81; National
Health Service' (Scotland) Act, 1947, 10 & 11 GEo, 6, c. 27.
2 Matter of Perkins, 2 A.D.2d 655, 152 N.Y.S.2d 315 (1st Dep't 1956);
Matter of Bishop, 1 A.D.2d 612, 152 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1st Dep't 1956).3This note will be concerned mainly with cases decided after 1931 when
the surrogate's court was empowered to apply -cy pres.. The'cases before that
date are few. See Note, 39 COLUm. L. Rav. 1358 (1939).
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Historical Background
The doctrine of cy pres applies only to charitable trusts. 4 Definitions of the doctrine have varied widely. 5 But, a generally acceptable definition is that of the Restatement of Trusts. It is there
said that:
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose,

and it is or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out the
particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more general intention to
devote the property to charitable purposes, the trust will not fail but the court
will direct the application of the property to some charitable purpose which falls
within the general charitable intention of the settlor.6

The formulation of the doctrine resulted essentially from a desire
to save for the public the benefit of a gift which otherwise would
lapse under the law applying to private trusts.7 Thus, where a
private trust.fails if the beneficiary is not definite and ascertained,
the application of cy pres will save a charitable trust.9 Again, where
a private trust fails because its purpose has already been accomplished,10 cy pres will save a charitable trust."
The origins of the doctrine reach back into antiquity.' 2 A case
in the third century applying the cy pres principle to save a gift to
the public for a purpose then illegal appears in the Digest of
Justinian. 13 The jurist there thought that, since the testator had
not intended the funds to go to his heirs, he might be memorialized
in another manner. Indeed, the Roman Law treated the performance
of many public duties as acts of charity.14 When, during the Middle
Ages the English ecclesiastical chancellors began to apply the cy pres
principle, 15 they fused the Roman public-duty concept with their own
theory that gifts to charity should be upheld for the good of the soul
42A BoGzT, TRusTs AND TRusizs § 431, at 317 (.1953) ; 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS
§399, at 2826 (2d ed. 1956).
5See FrscR, THE Cy Pars DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES § 1.00, at 1
(1950).
62 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 399 (1935).
7BoGER, TRUSTS § 147, at 567 (3d ed. 1952).
s Id. § 34, at 148.
,

9 See, e.g., Matter of Durbrow, 245 N.Y. 469, 157 N.E. 747 (1927);

2A BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 438, at 373 (1953).
10 BoGER, TRUSTS § 150, at 582 (3d ed. 1952) ; NEWMAN, TRUSTS 498 (2d

ed. 1955).
"1See, e.g., 2A BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEzS §439, at 378-79 (1953);
2 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 399, comment h (1935); 4 ScOT, TRUSTS § 399.2,
at 2838
(2d ed. 1956).
12
FIScu, THE Cy PREs DOCTRINE IN THE UNrID STATES § 1.02, at 3 (1950).
13 See Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 52 (1890).
14 See Willard, Iflutrations of the Origin of Cy Pres, 8 HAgv. L. Ray. 69,
71-72 (1894).
15 How the cy pres doctrine was absorbed into the common law is not certain.
See FIscH, op. cit. stpra note 12, § 1.03, at 4; Comment, 49 YALE L.J. 303, 309

(1939).
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of the giver.16 Consequently, gifts for the repair of bridges were
upheld as equally charitable as alms-giving and hence proper objects
of the chancellor's cy pres power. 17 Finally, in 1601 the Statute of
Charitable Uses 18 codified the law in England.
As the cy pres doctrine developed there, the chancellors exercised
their power in one of two ways.' 9 As judges of a court of equity they
exercised a judicial power, but as chancellors or keepers of the king's
conscience they exercised the king's prerogative right, as parens
21
patria4, to save trusts beyond the jurisdiction of equity courts.
The exercise of judicial cy pres was controlled by the equity court's
own jurisdictional limitations. The prerogative power, however, had
no bounds in fact but the king's will. 22 As a result, the chancellor,
in some early cases, abused the power 2 and brought discredit upon
the whole doctrine. This resulted from the fact that, at the time,
both types of cy pres were exercised by the chancellor without distinction.2 4 Thus, it was not until 1803 that this confusion was cleared
by Lord Eldon when he formulated a distinction still recognized in
England today. It remained for that great jurist to point out that
...[W]here there is a general indefinite purpose, not fixing itself upon any
object . . . the disposition is in the King by Sign Manual: but where the
execution is to be by a trustee with general or some23 objects pointed out, there
the Court will take the administration of the trust.

The prerogative power still exists in England today, but has little
significance. 26 Because this power is arbitrary, and hence, repugnant
to our theory of government, it has never been accepted in this
16 For general discussion, see Willard, supra note 14.
49 YAix L.J. 303, 309 (1939).
17 See Willard, supra note 14 at 71.

See also Comment,

IsStatute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Euz. 1, c. 4.

19 See 2 PERRY, TRusTs AND TRUSTES § 718, at 1222 (7th ed. 1929);
Comment, 13 CoDRNE
L.Q. 310, 312 (1928).
20

Under this name, the king had general administration of all charities.

2 PEaY, op. cit. supra note 19.
21 A Massachusetts court classified such cases as follows: "The principal,
if not the only, cases in which the disposition of a charity is held to be in the
crown by sign manual, are of two classes; the first, of bequests to particular
uses charitable in their nature, but illegal, as for a form of religion not tolerated
by law; and the second, of gifts of property to charity generally, without any
trust interposed, and in which either no appointment is provided for, or the
power of appointment is delegated to persons who die without exercising it."
Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 574 (1867).

22 See 2 PERRY, op. cit. supra note 19; 4 Scorr, TRusTs § 399.1, at 2831
(2d ed. 1956) ; Comment, 49 YALE L.J. 303, 305 (1939).

23 See, e.g., Cary v. Abbot, 7 Ves. Jr. 490, 32 Eng. Rep. 198 (Rolls 1802);
Da Costa v. De Pas, 1 Amb. 6.228, 27 Eng. Rep. 150 (Ch. 1754). See also
4 Scotr,
ThusTs § 399.1, at 2829 (2d ed. 1956).
24
See 2 PERRY, TRuSTS Am) TRUsTEES § 718, at 1222 (7th ed. 1929);
Comment, 13 CoRNELL LQ. 310, 312 (1928).
25 Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. Jr. 36, 86, 32 Eng. Rep. 15, 32 (Ch. 1803).
28 See Comment, 49 YALE L.J. 303, 306 (1939) ; Comment, 13 CoRxaL L.Q.

310, 313,314 (1928).
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country.- Whether this power inheres today in the American legislatures, as successors to the powers of the English kings, is a ques27
tion left unanswered by more than 150 years of American case law.
Application of Cy Pres in the United States
For a time not even judicial cy pres was accepted in most
states.28 Some jurisdictions, confused by common-law history, failed
to distinguish between prerogative and judicial cy pres.2 9 Others
believed that the English courts derived their power solely from the
Statute of Charitable Uses and that American cotirts had no such
power.30 A few denied the validity of charitable trusts and thus had
no opportunity to pass upon the doctrine.3 1 Gradually, as historical
misconceptions were corrected, states generally adopted the doctrine
through the courts or legislatures, with but six jurisdictions positively
rejecting it.32
In New York, the cy pres doctrine received little attention in
the nineteenth century while the courts determined the validity of
charitable trusts. The Legislathre in 1829 expressly limited legal
trusts to four classes of which charitable trusts were not included.3
In the leading case of': Williams v: Willins,34 however', the Comit
of Appeals upheld a trust for the education of poor children. 'In a
series of decisions thatfollowed it,3 5 the case was so criticized and
limited that it"
wasa,ll but overruled. Finally, in- 1893 -the Tilden
Act3 was passed validating charitable trusts- and giving the supreme
court control over them. The act was subsequently amended 37 and
21 See BoGERT, TRUSTS § 147, at 569 (3d e . -1952) ; 4 Scorr, -TRUSTS § 3992
(2d ed. 1956). Whether the -legislature could:exercise this power is a matter
of-dispute among.Jextwiter. "See -.e.g., :2A BoqERTn, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 434 (1953); 2 Pmy, TRUSTS AND TRUSTiES'§, 719,. at 1225 (7th ed. 1929);
2- R S ATS;%ENT, TAvs,%; §.399, comment e (1935); 4 .ScoTr, TusTs § 399.2

(2d28ed. 1956).
See Fisch, The Cy Pres,Doctri.;e and ,Changing Phlsophies,..51 .MicE.

L.- Rtv. 375, 377 (1953).

PP:S.4e FisCHi THE CY PRES DoCqRIN

IZN-THE UNiTD:SATES .§2.03, at 56

(1950) ; Note, 8-CoaNEL L.Q. 179,, 181-82 (1923).
30 See Comment, 49 YALE L.J. 303,.306-07 (1939).
31 See FiscE, op. cit. supra note- 29,. § 2.02, at 28,29.
32 See NEwMAN, TRUSTS 195-96 (2d ed. 1955).
The states. are Arizona,
Alabama, Delaware, North. Carolina,., South Carolina. and Tennessee.
In
Alabama and North Carolina,-the courts exercise the same power but unc[er
different doctrines. Id.
33 N.Y. REv. STAT.. 1828, c. -1, tit. 2, §§ 45, 55.
34.8 N.Y. .525 (1853).
35 See Cottman v. Grace, 112 N.Y. 299, 307, 19 N.E. 839, 841 (1889) 4
Holmes v. Mead, 52 N.Y. 332; 337 (1873) ; Bascotm v. Albertson, 34 N.Y. 584,

589 (1866).

36 Laws of N.Y. - 1893r c. 70L

37 Laws of N.Y. 1901, . 291, § 1; Laws of N.Y. 1909,.c. 144, §§ 1, 2; Laws
of N.Y. 1931, c. 562, §§ 8, 9; Laws of N.Y. 1953, c. 715, §§ 1, 2.
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as amended is found today in both the Real Property Law 3 8 and
Personal Property Law.389 With the validity of charitable trusts
established by legislative enactment, the path was cleared for the
application of the cy pres doctrine. Thus, since 1893 the New
York courts have
frequently applied the doctrine in a variety of
40
circumstances.
When the courts exercise the cy pres power today, they are
applying a rule of construction, 41 rather than wielding an unlimited
power to revise a will. In construing the will and the testator's intention, the court will make the construction as liberal as possible
in order to save the trust.42 Where there is an absolute gift to a
charity 43 or where, though in trust, no particular charity is named
as beneficiary 44 the courts will apply cy pres. To find the necessary
intent, the courts look to the will and any pertinent external evidence. 4 5 In exercising the cy pres power, the courts must use a
great degree of discretion. 6 They are confronted with such an unusual variety of factual situations that almost every case must be
considered sui generis.47 But the exercise of the court's discretion
in apply'ing cy]pres should not be -confused--with the 'court'" usual
equitable pbwers. For example, as a gene-r:l rule, a court. may appoint a trustee in order to save a trUst, 4 6 ' or may permit a' Yriance
of a trust scheme inder the doctrine', of deviation, 9 These are not
instances of the use of cy pres.
To. exercise the cy pres power, a court mu~t find thre&precedent
conditions. :Frst, the gift or trust must-.be chariable . ii hature. 50
Secondly, the language -of the will rea&n -coniection wit6; the surrounding circumstances must indicate that-the testator had",the intention 'to aid chatity" in- general
And, fnally, the couft must
38

N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW

39 N.Y. PEas. Paoa.'.,LN

§ 113(1), (2), (2-a).
§ 12(1), - (2),

(2-a)..

40 See Allen v. Stevens, 161, MY, 12ZwS5'N.E.,68 (-1899); Note, 39 CoLUM.
L. 'Rv.
1358 (1939 .
4
1See, e.g., Matter of MuDowell,.-217 N.Y. 454, 112 N.E. 177- (1916);
Matter of, Lawless, 194 -Misc, 844, 87 N.Y.S.2d 386 (Surr. Ct. 1949) ; 2 PERRY,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 728 (7th ed. 1929).
42 See Matter of MacDowell, supra note. 41; BOGEaRT. TRUSTS § 147, at 567

(3d -ed. 1952).

43See City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Arnold, 283 N.Y. 184, 27 N.E.2d
984 (1940) ; 2A BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 431, at 318 (1953).
4 See Matter of Durbrow, 245 N.Y. 469, 157 N.E. 747 (1927); 4 Scorr,
TRUSTS § 399, at 2826 (2d ed. 1956).
45 See 2 PERRY, TRUSTS Apxo TRUSTEES §723, at 1232 (7th ed. 1929).
46 See Matter of MacDowell, 217 NY. 454, 112 N.E. 177 (1916).
47
See 2A BoGERT, TRUSTS. AND ,TRUSTEES §.436, at: 346 (1953); Comment,
49 YAL L.E. 303, 310 (1939).
48 NEW MAN, TRUSTS 108 (2d ed. 1955).
" See 2A BoGaT, TRusTs AND TRUSTEES § 431 (1953) ; 4 ScoTrr, TRUSTS
§ 399, at 2826 (2d ed. 1956).
5o See note 4 supra.
.5 1 See FiscH, THE CY PREs DocmN IN THE UNITED STATES § 5.03, at 147
(1950) ; .2 RESTATEME
,_Tansrs §:399 (1935); 4 Scorr, TRUSTS § 399,3 (2d
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determine that the specific trust purpose has failed or become impossible or impracticable to achieve.52
At times, the courts have found it difficult to determine whether
this latter condition to the application of cy pres has been met by
the facts of a particular case. However, they have recognized numerous situations in which the express trust scheme fails. Thus, cy pres
has been applied where the specific purpose has already been
accomplished I' or where the specific purpose is impossible of fulfillment; 54 as well as where the trust funds are insufficient 5r and where
it is impracticable to carry out the specific purpose.5 6 Less difficult
to recognize as situations giving rise to a proper exercise of the
power are instances where the specific purpose fails for lack of
consent,57 or where the beneficiary is a non-existent corporation.5"
On the other hand, cy pres has not been applied where the trust or
gift is not charitable in nature, 59 or where the testator's intent is to
benefit only the particular charity named.60 Neither will cy pres be
ed. 1956).

One writer pointed out that the court is doing what is desirable in

view of public policy, rather than giving effect to the testator's intent.
2A BOGEr, TRusTs AND TRUSTEES § 436, at 344 (1953).

52See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §113(2); N.Y. Pzas. PROP. LAW
§ 12(2) ; 2 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 399, comment f (1935); 4 ScoTT, TRusTs

§ 1399.2, at 2831 (2d ed. 1956).
153 See Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539 (1867); 2 RESTATEMENT,
TRUSTS § 399, comment h (1935); 4 ScoTr, TRUSTS § 399.2, at 2838 (2d ed.
1956) ; cf. Matter of Neher, 279 N.Y. 370, 18 N.E.2d 625 (1939).
54 See Matter of Rupprecht, 271 App. Div. 376, 65 N.Y.S.2d 909 (4th Dep't
1946), aff'd per curiam, 297 N.Y. 462, 74 N.E.2d 175 (1947) ; Matter of Lewis,
208 Misc. 968, 145 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Surr. Ct 1953), rev'd mer., 278 App. Div.
8, 104 N.Y.S.2d 952 (4th Dep't 1951), rev'd mem., 308 N.Y. 795, 125 N.E2d
598 (1955); Matter of Heckscher, 131 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup. Ct. 1954);
2 RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS § 399 (1935) ; 4 ScoTr, TRUSTS § 3992, at 2838 (2d ed.
1956).
55 See Matter of Gary, 248 App. Div. 373, 288 N.Y. Supp. 382 (1st Dep't
1936) (per curiam) ; Matter of Lawless, 194 Misc. 844, 87 N.Y.S.2d 386 (Surr.
Ct. 1949) ; Matter of Borden, 180 Misc. 988, 42 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Surr. Ct. 1943) ;
2A BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTE s § 438, at 362-64 (1953); 2 RESTATEMENT,
TRusTS § 399, comment g (1935) ; 4 Scorr, TRUSTS § 399.2, at 2834-38 (2d ed.
1956).
56 See Matter of Neher, 279 N.Y. 370, 18 N.E.2d 625 (1939); Matter of
Swan, 237 App. Div. 454, 261 N.Y. Supp. 428 (4th Dep't 1933), aff'd mem.
sub om. St. John's Church of Mt. Morris v. Kelly, 263 N.Y. 638, 189 N.E. 734
(1934) ; BoGERT, TRUSTS § 147, at 570 (3d ed. 1952); 2 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS
§399, comment m (1935).
57 See Matter of Gary, supra note 55; 2 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 399,
comment i (1935) ; 4 Scorr, TRuSTS § 399.2, at 2839 (2d ed. 1956).
58 See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 113(2-a) ; N.Y. PEis. PROP. LAW § 12(2-a);
FIscE, THE Cy Pams Docm ix THE Um=rzx STATES § 6.02(b), at 181-82
(1950) ; 4 Scorr, TRUSTS § 399.2, at 2840 (2d ed. 1956).
59 See Matter of Merritt, 280 N.Y. 391, 21 N.E.2d 365 (1939); Matter of
Carpenter, 163 Misc. 474, 297 N.Y. Supp. 649 (Surr. Ct 1937); 2A BOGERT,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 431, at 317 (1953).
See also note 4 supra.
60 See Matter of Syracuse University, 2 Misc. 2d 446, 150 N.Y.S.2d 251
(Sup. Ct. 1956) ; Saltsman v. Greene, 136 Misc. 497, 243 N.Y. Supp. 576 (Sup.
Ct. 1930), affd mem., 231 App. Div. 781, 246 N.Y. Supp. 913 (3d Dep't 1930),
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applied where the testator provides for failure of the trust by a trust
In any case where application6 2of cy pres is requested, the
over.6
Attorney General is a necessary party.
Application of Cy Pres in New York
As leaders in the formulation of contemporary trends, the New
York courts have applied the cy pres doctrine with increasing
liberality.6 Thus, it has been held that absolute gifts to charitable
corporations are within the scope of the cy pres statute and are
proper objects of its exercise. 6 4 Under the theory of liberal construction, the courts have used their discretion freely. In Matter
of Gary,65 for example, testatrix made a gift of various objects of
art together with a fund to maintain the objects, to the Metropolitan
Museum of Art upon certain conditions. One such condition was
that none of the objects was to be sold. The will provided for a
change of beneficiaries should any condition be broken. When it
appeared that the gift was unacceptable to museums because the
maintenance fund was insufficient, the court allowed some of the
objects to be sold to preserve the remaining pieces. Although an
express provision of the will was violated by so doing, the court
achieved as nearly as possible, the original purpose of the testatrix
under changed conditions which she had never foreseen.
In Matter of Clark 66 and Matter of Dillenback 67 the surrogates
found no difficulty in applying cy pres by directing that income from
a trust intended to help pay a Methodist minister be used instead to
help pay a Presbyterian minister. In both cases a church of each
denomination was located in the town at the time the testator died,
but the Methodist church closed its doors thereafter. Noting the
co-operation between the two churches, the court, in each case,
found that the testator intended to help the Christian church in the
town generally; hence cy pres was applicable.
aff'd mer., 256 N.Y. 636, 177 N.E. 172 (1931); In re Gault, 48 N.Y.S.2d 928
(Surr. Ct. 1944) ; 4 ScoTT, TRusTs § 399.2, at 2842-44 (2d ed. 1956).
61 See Matter of Fletcher, 280 N.Y. 86, 19 N.E.2d 794 (1939) ; Matter of
Price, 264 App. Div. 29, 35 N.Y.S2d 111 (3d Dep't), aff'd mem., 289 N.Y. 751,
46 N.E2d 354 (1942); BoGESR, TRusTs § 147, at 572-73 (3d ed. 1952) ; FiscH,
THE Cy PPms DocrRNE IN THE UNITED STATES § 5.03(a), at 151 (1950).
62 See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 113(3); N.Y. PERs. PRop. LAW § 12(3);
4 ScoTT, Tausrs § 399, at 2828 (2d ed. 1956).
63 See Comment, 49 YALE I.J. 303, 322 n.131 (1939).
See also cases cited
at notes 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71 infra.
64 See City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Arnold, 283 N.Y. 184, 27 N.E.2d
984 (1940) ; Sherman v. Richmond Hose Co. No. 2, 230 N.Y. 462, 130 N.E. 613
(1921).
65 248 App. Div. 373, 288 N.Y. Supp. 382 (1st Dep't 1936) (per curiam).
66 1 Misc. 2d 869, 150 N.Y.S.2d 65 (Surr. Ct. 1956).
67 189 Misc. 3d 538, 74 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Surr. Ct. 1947), aff'd mein., 273 App.
Div. 1051 (4th Dep't 1948). '

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 31

In the-recent case of Matter of Lee, 63 cy pres was applied to
save a bequest to a tuberculosis sanitarium. The testatrix directed
that a memorial cottage be built to house patients at the sanitarium's
Saranac Lake, New York, location. But eight months after she
died, the sanitarium closed its hospital although it continued its research activities on respiratory ailments. The court ordered the
bequest be given to the sanitarium as a memorial endowment fund,
the income to be used "for the benefit of persons suffering from
respiratory or other similar disorders." 69 In other cases courts have
directed the sale of privately endowed parks and applied the proceeds
to public parks, 70 and have diverted property and funds left to maintain homes for the aged and infirm to agencies dispensing similar
services. 7 ' In each case the court determined the testator's intention.
Then, guided by the general intent, the court sought a scheme in
substitution for the original plan which would effectuate the testator's
will generally, and consequently benefit the public. So, in the Clark
and Dillenback"cases the court achieved the testator's intention to
benefit the Christian church in the town by substituting a new beneficiary for one no longer in existence.
Where the courts have not applied cy pres, they have felt constrained not to do so only by the testator's own intention or the
nature of the gift. Thus in Matter of Fletcher72 the testator bequeathed a sum for the construction and maintenance of a hospital.
When the fund proved inadequate the trustee petitioned for application cy pres of the fund. The court denied the petition because the
testator provided for an alternate disposition should the bequest"
"'for any reason, be declared illegal or inoperative.' ".7 In Matter
of Grossinan 74 the court was asked to save a bequest to. the Socialist
Labor Party, an unincorporated association not able to take bequests
under New York law. 75 The court denied the application on the
ground, among others, that the named beneficiary was not a charitable
organization. The courts have also occasionally withheld cy pres
where they construed testator's intention narrowly. Thus, in Matter
3 Misc. 2d 1072 (Surr. Ct. 1956).
Matter of Lee, 3 Misc. 2d 1072, 1080 (Surr. Ct. 1956). See also Matter
of Scott, 1 Misc. 2d 206, 145 N.Y.S.2d 346 (Surr. Ct. 1955).
70 See, e.g., Smith v. Village of P.tchogue, 285 App. Div. 1190, 141 N.Y.S2d
244 (2d Dep't 1955) (mem. opinion); In re Heckscher, 131 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup.
Ct. 1954).
71 See, e.g., Matter of Swan, 237 App. Div. 454, 261 N.Y. Supp. 428 (4th
Dep't 1933), aff'd sub nor. St. John's Church of Mt. Morris v. Kelly, 263
N.Y. 638, 189 N.E. :734 (1934); Matter of Lewis, 208 Misc. 968, 145
N.Y.S.2d 829 (Surr. Ct. 1953), aff'd inem., 308 N.Y. 795, 125 N.E2d 598
(1955) ; Matter of Lawless, 194 Misc. 844, 87 N.Y.S.2d 386 (Surr. Ct. 1949).
72 280 N.Y. 86, 19 N.E2d 794 (1939).
73 Matter of Fletcher, 280 N.Y. 86, 90, 19 N.E2d 794 (1939).
74 190 Misc. 521, 75 N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sufrr. Ct. 1947).
75 See Matter of Cunningham, 206 N.Y. 601, 100 N.E. 437 (1912).
8
9
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of Collins 76 testator left a legacy to the "Children of St. Joseph's

Hospital." A closely-divided court 77 affirmed the Surrogate's ruling
that the gift lapsed because it was a direct gift and not a charitable
trust. Such narrow constructions are the exception, however, and
not the rule. 78
A Current Problem
The current problem facing the courts in construing a testator's
intention is that stated at the outset of this note. That is, is a hospital formerly devoted to charitable work and voluntarily supported,
but now operated by the government, still to be considered charitable
in nature? Or, more broadly stated, does a government-operated
institution have a charitable character? In Matter of Bishop 79 the
court answered the questions affirmatively, citing with approval English decisions on the same question. It points out that the testatrix
must be deemed to have anticipated changes in the modes of paying
for medical care. In answer to the argument that the hospital intended to be benefited no longer existed, the court said that only
the administration has changed and that the former voluntary entity
continues. On the direct question of charitable character the court
accepted without question the English conclusion that such hospitals
are charitable and pointed out that they would ".

.

. not evoke a

difficulty that the courts .intimately concerned with the impact of this
statutory purpose on charitable hospitals do not find in it." 80
The same day the court decided the Bishop case, it decided
Matter of Perkins.8s
The facts in this latter case were similar to
those in the Bishop case except that the testator in Perkins had died
at a much earlier date. Though the Bishop case was decided unanimously, Justice Frank, who did not participate in that decision,
wrote a strong dissent in the Perkins case.8 2 Justice Frank urged
76 254 App. Div. 649, 3 N.Y.S.2d 291 (1st Dep't 1938) (mer. opinion).
77 The decision was 3-2. For cases in apparent agreement with the dissent,

see footnote 78 infra.
78 See, e.g., Matter of Durbrow, 245 N.Y. 469, 157 N.E. 747 (1927); In re
Smith, 70 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Surr. Ct. 1947) ; Matter of Whittelsey, 180 Misc. 602,
41 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Surr. Ct. 1943).
79 1 A.D.2d 612, 152 N.Y.S.2d 310 (lst Dep't 1956).
80 Matter of Bishop, 1 A.D.2d 612, 616, 152 N.Y.S.2d 310, 314 (1st Dep't
1956). The surrogate's court of Oneida County, was confronted by a case in
1954 presenting the same facts as those in the Bishop case. The surrogate felt
that the trust over should go to the nationalized hospital providing the board
of governors guaranteed a proper use of the funds consistent with the testatrix'
intentions. The surrogate so decided because "[w]hile there may now be technical differences in the organizational set-up, nevertheless there could be no
closer approximation of the wishes and intent of this decedent, which were to
benefit medically the people of that area ... ." Matter of Ablett, 206 Misc.
157, 170, 132 N.Y.S.2d 488, 500 (Surr. Ct 1954).
812 A.D.2d 655, 152 N.Y.S.2d 315 (1st Dep't 1956).
82 Matter of Perkins, 2 A.D.2d 655, 152 N.Y.S.2d 315 (lst Dep't 1956).
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application of cy pres on the ground that the operation of hospitals
was no longer a charitable enterprise but a government function, and
that the testator could never have intended the result that the majority had approved. He pointed to the parliamentary debates that
preceded passage of the nationalization act s1 to show that the government intended to abolish the hospitals as charities and distinguished
the English cases relied upon by the majority by showing constitutional differences. These differences are rooted in the fact that English courts are bound by national policy as established by parliament
while ours are not. He further felt that a man dying in 1907 could
not possibly have anticipated the nationalization of hospitals then
charitable. Noting that the testator, in the same paragraph of his
will made a gift to a voluntary private hospital in New York City,
Justice Frank urged that the trust be directed by the court's cy pres
power to some charitable New York City hospital.
The question presented by these recent cases has not been frequently considered by New York courts. By statute, gifts in trust
of real and personal property may be made to municipal corporations
for charitable purposes. 8 4 But this does not make municipal corporations charitable in nature. The lower courts have given divided
opinions on the question. In two cases 85 the courts felt that to give
to a governmental group what was intended for a private enterprise
would be to frustrate the donor's intention. They believed that such
a construction would benefit the taxpayer and not the class the donor
intended. The facts in Matter of Syracuse University8 6 are strikingly
similar to those in the Bishop and Perkins cases. There, the testator established a trust for the College of Medicine of Syracuse
University. When the university decided to abandon the school for
economic reasons, New York State intervened and, using the same
physical plant, continued the school as the State University Medical
Center. The court held that the bequest lapsed because the testator
intended to benefit his alma mater exclusively. ". . . [T] he inference
that the testator intended to ameliorate the tax burden of the People
of the State of New York is wholly unwarranted." 87
88
This same argument was answered in Matter of Harrington.
There, the testator gave a life estate to a niece with remainder to a
privately-owned .hospital, to build an annex. Before the life tenant
died, the City of Rome bought the hospital. In a construction proceeding, awarding the remainder to the then municipally owned hos83 Ibd.
84 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 114; N.Y. PERs. PRop. LAW § 13.
85 Matter of Syracuse University, 2 Misc. 2d 446, 150 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Sup.
Ct. 1956); Matter of O'Hanlon, 147 Misc. 546, 264 N.Y. Supp. 251 (Surr.

Ct. 1933).

862 Misc. 2d 446, 150 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Sup. Ct 1956).
Matter of Syracuse University, 2 Misc. 2d 446, 454, 150 N.Y.S.2d 251, 260

87

(Sup. Ct. 1956).
88243 App. Div. 235, 276 N.Y. Supp. 868 (4th Dep't 1935).
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pital, the court upheld the gift as charitable and rejected the
taxpayer-burden argument. The court felt that giving strict effect
to the charitable intent of the testatrix did not necessarily mean
relieving the taxpayer of expense, since, in the absence of a bequest,
public funds may not have been used for this purpose.8 9 In other
cases the courts have found no difficulty in exercising the cy pres
power by giving funds to a county home for the aged where the
funds were inadequate to maintain a private home; 1 by conveying
a park to the town; 91 and by permitting a town to build an administration building on land left for a hospital.9 2 Since, indicated
previously, the exercise of the cy pres power is confined to charities,
it would seem that these cases, at least by implication, have recognized a charitable character in publicly-owned institutions.
One other jurisdiction has been presented with the identical
problem .posed by the Bishop and Perkins cases. In the First
National Bank v. King Edward's Hospital Fund,93 an Illinois appellate court directed under its cy pres power that the fund be given to
the named hospitals, although it recognized that the use of cy pres
was not necessary. The court there found that the testator had the
general intent to promote the health of the community where he was
born and pointed out that regardless of whether the government has
taken on this task, ". . . 'the furnishing of medical and hospital
service to human beings, is a worthy charitable purpose.' "94
Conclusion
It would seem that the majority in the Bishop and Perkins cases
refused to meet squarely the main problem. Instead of determining
independently the charitable nature of nationalized hospitals, the court
accepted without question the findings of English courts. Even in
that country, these decisions may not be authoritative answers.95
The court said:
"If the present owner of the hospital building in question, the city of
Rome, does not wish, or will not permit, an 'annex' or 'addition' to its
building ...it cannot be forced to have it, but it may not then claim
the money for use in a manner not contemplated by the will."
Matter of Harrington, 243 App. Div. 235, 239, 276 N.Y. Supp. 868, 872 (4th
Dep't 1935).
89

91 See, e.g., Matter of Lewis, 208 Misc. 968, 145 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Surr. Ct.

1953), af'd mem., 308 N.Y. 795, 125 N.E2d 598 (1955).
9912 See, e.g., In re Heckscher, 131 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
See, e.g., Matter of Neher, 279 N.Y. 370, 18 N.E.2d 625 (1939).
93 1 Ill. App. 2d 338, 117 N.E2d 656 (1954).
The Supreme Court of Rhode

Island has also had before it a similar situation in Pennsylvania Co., v. Board
of Governors, 79 R.I. 74, 83 A.2d 881 (1951). Since the testator provided for
the failure of the gift to the hospitals in any way, however, the court did not
have9 4 to cope with the problem presented by the Bishop and Perkins cases.
First Nat'l Bank v. King Edward's Hospital Fund, 1 Ill. App. 2d 338,
117 N.E.2d 656, 667 (1954).
95 See 94 SOL. J.608, 609 (1950).
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Since the governmental structure there differs from ours and that
government has established a policy of administering medical service
alien to ours, the majority's reliance upon the English decisions
appears ill-founded.
In effect, the court has equated a public purpose with a charitable purpose. Under the Roman Law later fused into early English
decisions this construction would have been correct.96 Is it correct
today? A distinction between two types of charitable gifts must be
drawn. For example a testator may devise real property to a municipality for the purpose of maintaining a park. The testator may also
devise the property to a private charitable corporation for the same
purpose. Thus, a gift may be made to a municipal corporation performing public duties and the gift may be charitable0 7 and for the
public benefit. But a gift to a private charitable corporation is meant
to aid voluntary charitable works, not governmentally maintained.
The argument may be made that in either case the public is to be
benefited and it matters little whether the means are voluntary or not.
The difficulty with this approach is that it subordinates the intention
of the testator in favor of the public good; whereas the judge in
every case should be guided primarily by the former and not the
latter. The court must devise a scheme to benefit the class of persons the testator intended to benefit. Applying cy pres in any other
way smacks of prerogative cy pres. So, if the testator wishes to aid
the sick poor in general or in a particular area, and the only effect
of giving gifts to nationalized hospitals is to provide relief for the
taxpayers, can it be said that his intent is effectuated?
The decision of the court in the Bishop and Perkins cases appears inconsistent with the liberal spirit that has characterized
application of cy pres in New York. The courts, as shown by the
cases cited above, 98 have not hesitated to change the testator's original plan in order to give effect to his intentions. With the continuing
expansion of government into various fields, the courts will undoubtedly be faced again with the problem discussed here. It is
recommended that, they meet the problem with the liberal spirit that
has characterized contemporary application of cy pres rather than
the narrow construction presently put forward.

96
97

See text at note 14 sipra.
See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 114; N.Y. PERS.

PROP. LAW § 13.
98 See cases cited in text at notes 65, 66, 67, 68 supra and cases cited in notes

at 70, 71 supra.

